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Abstract   The American Fisheries Act (AFA) of 1998 significantly altered the
Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands pollock fishery by allowing the formation of
harvesting and processing cooperatives and defining exclusive fishing rights.
This paper uses data envelopment analysis and stochastic production frontier
models to examine effects of the AFA on the fishing capacity, technical harvest-
ing efficiency (TE), and capacity utilization (CU) of pollock catcher-processors.
Results from multi-input, multi-output models indicate that fishing capacity fell
by more than 30% and that harvesting TE and CU measures increased relative
to past years. This work provides examples of how existing data, which is cur-
rently devoid of operator costs and provides only general indicators of earnings,
may be used to analyze changes in elements of fleet and vessel performance in
response to management actions.
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Introduction
A lack of well-defined property rights can have a variety of harmful effects on a fishery.
One common repercussion is the presence of excess fishing capacity. Excess capacity
arises because the incentives inherent to open-access (or restricted open-access) fisheries
are different than those that would exist in a rationalized fishery. If exclusive rights to
harvest a particular amount of fish are not defined, an excessive number of vessels will
enter a fishery — dissipating economic rents.1 In order to compete with other vessels for
the increasingly scarce catch, fishermen will often operate increasingly large vessels,
further exacerbating excess capacity in the fishery. While this strategy may temporarily
afford one a larger share of the catch, the collective effect is further decrease in overall
rents and may result in vessels sitting idle for much of the year. It is clear that the costs
of this type of regime exceed those that would prevail in a rationalized fishery.
In addition to shortened seasons and losses in social welfare, excess capacity
also creates pressure for managers to keep the total allowable catch (TAC) above
sustainable levels in order to preserve employment, increasing the likelihood of
overfishing. And, with the little remaining economic rents spread among so many ves-
sels, fishermen are more vulnerable to changes in regulations and TACs instituted to
curb overfishing. As a result, policy tools available to resource managers become more
difficult to implement, both politically and socially (Kirkley and Squires 1999).
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1 With private ownership, marginal costs are typically equated with price. In open access, however, aver-
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While economic theory offers potential solutions to such problems, the “solu-
tions” themselves give rise to additional questions regarding the distribution of ben-
efits among fishery participants — such as determining those that will be given
rights to participate or the amount of catch each participant will be allocated
(Criddle and Macinko 2000). These issues can lead to heated battles in political and pub-
lic arenas, which can delay actions that could help to eliminate or diminish the causes of
excess capacity and overfishing. Such is the case in the Alaskan groundfish fisheries,
where conflict between the inshore and offshore sectors regarding the allocation of
pollock (the most valuable of all Alaska groundfish by far) persisted for some time,
while simultaneously, little progress was made toward eliminating the annual race
for fish. In fact, half of the catcher-processors operating between 1994–98 experi-
enced financial difficulties resulting in bankruptcy or forced the sale of the vessel
(NPFMC 2001). Recently, however, legislation was passed that altered the charac-
teristics of the fishery and eliminated incentives that give rise to excess capacity.
The American Fisheries Act (AFA), implemented in 1999, included measures
aimed at rationalizing the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (BSAI) pollock fishery.
The main components of the Act involved identifying vessels and shoreside proces-
sors eligible to participate in harvesting and processing, buying back nine catcher-
processor vessels, allocating about 10% more of the TAC to the inshore sector, and
authorizing the formation of harvesting and fishing cooperatives among the remain-
ing participants. It is likely that the rationalization has significantly improved the
overall economic performance of the fishery, as the long-standing race for fish has
been eliminated and season lengths have increased (Larkin 1999).
Many interesting questions naturally arise when considering the effects of the
Act. Recently, Matulich, Sever, and Inaba (2001) used a game-theoretical approach
to discuss the likely distribution of benefits among inshore sector catcher vessels
and processors. This paper instead focuses on catcher-processors in the offshore sec-
tor and analyzes changes in economic performance that have occurred since implemen-
tation of the AFA. The scope of prospective analysis is somewhat limited, however, as
industry participants have been unwilling to provide information on operating costs and
earnings (perhaps because of the historical battle over the allocation of quota).2 Thus, an
additional purpose of this work is to illustrate methods for analyzing changes in fleet
and vessel performance over time in response to management actions (such as the AFA)
in the absence of cost and revenue data. Using commonly available data on catch, effort
levels, and vessel characteristics, this paper constructs and compares measures of tech-
nical harvesting efficiency (TE), capacity, and capacity utilization (CU) for catcher-
processors in the pre- and post-AFA periods. This approach allows for an examina-
tion of several repercussions of the AFA, with a focus on four particular issues.
The first issue to be examined is whether the nine decommissioned vessels were
historically more or less technically efficient than the vessels that remained in the
fishery. This comparison may be of interest to some of the AFA opponents who claimed
that the process used to select the buyback vessels was politically motivated and not
aimed at keeping the “best” vessels in the fishery. Such claims may be partially vali-
dated if, for example, results indicate the decommissioned vessels were outperforming
similar remaining vessels by a wide margin.3 The second area of examination is how the
2 There are three primary reasons (two of which are seemingly contradictory) why industry participants
may be reticent to provide detailed economic information. The first reason is that they do not want to
appear “too profitable,” as it might show they could financially withstand allocation changes that are not
in their favor. The second reason is that they do not want to appear “too unprofitable,” as it might show
that quota might be better allocated to those that outperform them. A third reason is to avoid sharing
information that might be used advantageously by competitors.
3 I say “partially” because the relative performance measures computed here are a subset of the many
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TE and CU of AFA-eligible vessels changed after the AFA was implemented. It is rea-
sonable to expect that CU would increase due to longer seasons and lack of a race for
fish, but TE may have increased as well, since more time was afforded to find highly
populated areas and exchange information regarding the best places to fish.
The third issue addressed by this paper is how the fishing capacity of catcher-pro-
cessors has changed post-AFA. At-sea processors in the BSAI pollock fishery state that
prior to implementation of the AFA, their fishing capacity was “three times the capacity
needed to harvest the annual pollock TAC” (NPFMC 2001). However, even after nine
vessels were decommissioned through the AFA, five of the remaining eligible vessels
have been idled during certain times of the year — implying that there may still be ex-
cess capacity in the fishery.4 In addition, “sideboard” provisions have been necessary to
prohibit AFA-qualified vessels from competing in other fisheries, presumably due to the
perception that latent capacity could spill over at critical times. Thus, it is of interest to
estimate the current catcher-processor harvesting capacity, how it changed after the AFA
was passed, and the extent to which it exceeds their share of TAC. The results may also
be used to draw more general conclusions on how rationalization affects capacity in a
fishery — a pertinent issue for other fisheries contemplating such changes.
The final question to be examined is whether relative TE and CU measures ap-
pear to be good indicators of economic performance.5 This issue will be addressed
by looking at the TE and CU scores of the catcher-processors and their associated
AFA status (AFA-eligible vs. AFA-ineligible, and eligible/active vs. eligible/idled).
If the vessels with the lowest TE and/or CU scores also happen to be the vessels that
were idled within a company or decommissioned, it provides evidence to support
that TE or CU measures may serve as reasonable indicators of relative profitability
when data on costs/earnings are unavailable.6 In addition to simple comparisons,
logit models are run to assess the use of measures of TE, CU, and whether a meal
plant is onboard as predictors of a vessel’s AFA status.7
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the
pollock catcher-processor fleet and the AFA, and is followed by an introduction of
the data envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic production frontier (SPF) mod-
els used to construct the estimates of interest. The next section describes the data
used in estimation, the results, and comparisons among groups and time periods.
The final section presents a summary and concluding remarks.
The Pollock Catcher-Processor Fleet and the AFA
The AFA affected many aspects of production for the catcher vessels, catcher-pro-
cessors, motherships, and processors participating in the BSAI pollock fishery. This
paper focuses on the catcher-processors, in particular, for three main reasons. First,
nine catcher-processors were bought back and decommissioned through AFA provi-
sions and questions naturally arise regarding the relative performance of decommis-
sioned and eligible vessels, and how capacity changed in response to the buybacks.
4 Quota was transferred to other vessels within the company. Some of the vessels idled in the pollock
fishery continued to participate in the whiting fishery off Oregon and Washington.
5 The reason for this inquiry is that some authors have recently suggested that TE scores can be used to
determine which vessels to decommission when attempting to specify an optimal fleet for landing a par-
ticular TAC (Kirkley and Squires 1998, 1999).
6 Given that fishing companies are rational and best informed about the relative performance of their
own vessels, and that the race for fish has been eliminated, it is quite reasonable to think they would
operate their most profitable vessels (and idle the least profitable when idling a vessel is advantageous).
7 The ability to produce meal became especially important after improved retention and utilization re-
quirements for pollock and cod in 1998, so the presence of a meal plant may have weighed in the ob-
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Second, as many as five of the AFA-eligible vessels were idled in 1999 and 2000 by
companies owning multiple vessels, implying that these vessels may not have been
as profitable to operate as other vessels within the companies. By comparing the his-
torical TE and CU measures for idled and active vessels within a company, one can
examine the effectiveness of using such measures as indicators of relative profitabil-
ity when data on costs/earnings are unavailable. Third, the data available for the
catcher-processors provides the most complete set of data currently available for
analyzing effects of the AFA. Since all of the pollock catcher-processors exceed 124
feet in length, they have full federal observer coverage (as required by current regu-
lations) and their records thus possess the most thorough information on towing du-
ration, days at sea, and number of tows. Catcher-processors must also file weekly
production reports, which, among other things, include data on crew sizes. Further-
more, the cooperatives were implemented a year earlier for the catcher-processor
sector than for all other sectors, giving a larger “window” for post-AFA assessment.
The BSAI pollock fishery in which the catcher-processors operate is the largest
of all U.S. fisheries by volume; over two billion pounds of pollock are harvested an-
nually (by all fishery participants), accounting for over 20% of the total U.S. fishery
landings. The catcher-processor fleet generates nearly $300 million in annual pollock
revenue (NMFS 2001) from production of three main products: fillets (standard and
deep-skin), surimi, and roe. Fillets are key components of fish and chips, fish sand-
wiches, and frozen food products. Surimi is a fish paste product used to make imitation
crab and other similar products. Pollock roe is a very valuable product as well, and is
processed almost exclusively within the winter/spring months (or the “A” season).8
While the focus of this paper is the AFA, the legislation it contains is actually linked
to Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, the current revision
of the original Fishery Conservation and Management Act (FCMA) of 1976. The FCMA
extended U.S. fishery management authority to 200 miles off U.S. coastal shores, lead-
ing to the creation of the Fishery Conservation Zone, which is now the Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone. Congress enacted this law to protect and rebuild fish stocks and replace
foreign effort in U.S. fisheries with domestic effort. Under the FCMA, American fisher-
men got first priority to catch the fish, and strict limits on total catch off Alaska were
introduced in an attempt to maintain healthy stocks and rebuild overfished stocks. The
Anti-Reflagging Act of 1987 served to further Americanize the fishery, mandating that
all U.S.-flag fishing vessels must have been built or rebuilt in the U.S., and that all such
vessels be at least 51% U.S. owned and controlled. It also prohibited foreign-built ves-
sels from reflagging as U.S. ships, thereby circumventing the Americanization policy.
The Anti-Reflagging Act did not work as planned, however, as it included what
some people consider to be a loophole, allowing a flood of large, foreign-rebuilt fac-
tory trawlers to enter the U.S. fishery (Comstock 1998). In an attempt to rectify the
loophole, diminish the size and fishing power of the remaining catcher-processor
fleet, transfer more of the BSAI pollock TAC to the inshore sector, and rationalize
the fishery, the AFA was signed into law in 1998.
The main effects of the AFA with regard to the catcher-processor fleet are as
follows. First, their annual allocation of quota was decreased from about 46% of the
TAC to about 36%.9 The reallocation was accomplished by the aforementioned
8 Recently, the season has been further subdivided in response to Steller sea lion concerns, to spread out
the fishing in time and space.
9 Currently, 10% of the annual TAC is given to the community development quota (CDQ) program, and
3.6% is set aside for bycatch in other BSAI groundfish fisheries. The pollock catcher-processors are al-
located 40% of the remainder, with the inshore processing sector and motherships receiving 50% and
10%, respectively. This differs from the pre-AFA allocation in which 7.5% of the total went to CDQ,
there was no allocation for bycatch, 40% of the remainder went to the inshore sector, and 60% went to
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buyback of nine offshore catcher-processors (that had historically caught approxi-
mately 10% of the offshore quota), and by giving this share of quota to the inshore
sector. In exchange for the quota, the inshore sector agreed to pay $70 million of the
$90 million total paid to the decommissioned vessels (with the inshore sector paying
6 cents for each pound of pollock it harvested), while the other $20 million was
borne by taxpayers.
Second, the AFA allowed for the formation of cooperatives among catcher-pro-
cessors, among the catcher vessels that deliver to the catcher-processors, among eli-
gible motherships and catcher vessels in the mothership sector, and among the eli-
gible catcher vessels in the inshore sector of the BSAI pollock fishery. The catcher-
processor cooperative is called the Pollock Conservation Cooperative (PCC) and is
made up of eight companies that own 19 catcher-processors eligible to fish in the
pollock fishery.10 Within the PCC, each member company is contractually allocated
a percentage share of the total PCC allocation based on its historical catch levels.
The percentage share for each of the nine companies in 2000 ranged from 45.2%
(for the American Seafoods Company) to 4.3% (for the Starbound Ltd. Partnership).
The presence of company-specific allocations allows the companies freedom to
choose which (and how many) vessels to operate when landing their allocation and
allows participants to coordinate their efforts, rather than race for their portions.
Other provisions of the AFA limit the catch and bycatch of other groundfish and
non-groundfish species that can be taken by BSAI pollock fishery eligible vessels
(“sideboard” provisions). The AFA also imposes limits on the percent of the total
pollock fishery catch that may be harvested by any one individual or company.
The formation of the PCC occurred during the last two months of 1998 and al-
lowed members to coordinate plans for the fishing season beginning in January of
1999. Given the relatively short amount of time vessel owners had for developing
new arrangements, it is likely that the adjustments made for the 1999 season were
not extensive. Rather, the 2000 season may be more indicative of the type of
changes in production one would expect after rationalization, which should be re-
membered when interpreting the results presented later.
DEA and SPF Models
The measures of TE, CU, and capacity to be estimated in this paper are generated
within DEA and SPF models of catcher-processor harvesting. The theoretical basis
of the DEA and SPF models used here is the output distance function, Do(x,y), which
provides a complete characterization of multi-input, multi-output technologies.
As discussed by Färe and Primont (1995), the output distance function is defined on
the producible output set, Y(x), as Do(x,y) = minβ  {β : (y/β ) ∈  Y(x)}. Do(x,y) gives the
largest radial expansion of the output vector for a given input vector that is consistent
with the output vector belonging to Y(x), where it is assumed that potential increases in
output preserve the observed output mix.11 It can easily be shown that Do(x,y) ≤  1 for all
feasible output bundles, where Do(x,y) = 1 along the output isoquants of Y(x), and devia-
10 There is a twentieth catcher-processor, the Ocean Peace, which is also eligible to participate in the
pollock fishery but is not a PCC member.
11 One possibly restrictive aspect of this assumption is that actual increases in output may not hold the
current output mix constant. Changes in relative prices, stock conditions, or regulations (for both target
or bycatch species) may dictate a different output mix. Directional distance functions can be employed
in order to find increases in output for any type of expansion — not just radial — but given the biologi-
cal/technical interdependencies and limited species caught by this fleet, the observed mix seems to be a
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tions below one indicate increasing levels of technical inefficiency. Thus, the value of
the output distance function at each observation can be used to give a measure of TE.
Although DEA and SPF both attempt to identify a best-practice frontier for a
group of producers, they differ fundamentally in the way they generate the frontiers.
DEA is a non-parametric method that uses mathematical programming to construct a
piece-wise linear representation of the frontier of a technology. Deviations from the
frontier are measured and used to construct efficiency scores which can be inter-
preted as the estimated values of an output distance function. Alternatively, SPF is
an econometric approach that estimates parameters for a functional representation of
a technology and disentangles deviations from the estimated frontier into random er-
ror and inefficiency. TE (distance function) estimate scores are then computed from
the estimated parameter values and residuals.
Because SPF and DEA models were originally developed for estimating TE, one
must make some adaptations in order to use them to generate estimates of capacity
(which requires not only estimating the production possibilities frontier, as in the TE
models, but also estimating how far out it can shift). The change one makes to each
of the standard DEA and SPF models depends upon one’s interpretation of what is
represented by “capacity.” The different definitions of technical12 capacity that have
been suggested in the literature all correspond to some maximum quantity of output,
but differ in their assumptions regarding the level of variable inputs used in con-
junction with the capital stock. The approach taken here is to base the measure of
technical capacity on a maximal level of variable input use following Johansen
(1968), Färe, Grosskopf, and Kokkelenberg (1989), and Kirkley and Squires (1999).
More specifically, the definition offered by Johansen is “the maximum amount
that can be produced per unit of time with existing plant and equipment, provided
the availability of variable factors of production is not restricted.”13 This definition
of capacity corresponds to the output that could be produced under technically effi-
cient production with variable inputs fully employed, but constrained by the fixed
factors and the state of technology. However, when the Johansen notion is employed
in an empirical setting, and in particular, one where catch is governed by a TAC, the
variable input use may be far less than theoretically “unrestricted” levels. This im-
plies that resulting capacity estimates are likely to be more realistically obtainable
than the strict definition connotes — essentially representing the most output obtain-
able from a set of fixed factors and the maximum observed variable input use.
It is fairly straightforward to adapt each of the standard DEA and SPF models to
generate such estimates of capacity. The DEA model of Färe, Grosskopf, and
Kokkelenberg (1989, hereafter referred to as “FGK”), to be discussed further later,
was constructed so as to directly correspond to Johansen’s definition. As a result, it
is easier to implement than SPF when one is seeking a Johansen-based measure of
capacity. The “unrestricted” variable input levels in the DEA model are determined
internally in the model by first selecting groups of “peers” with similar fixed inputs
and then finding the maximum observed variable input levels for each group.14
The SPF approach is slightly more complicated, as one must manually specify
the unrestricted variable input levels associated with groups sharing similar fixed in-
12 This paper focuses on technical capacity rather than “economic” capacity, which has traditionally
been defined in terms of the output corresponding to a tangency between a short-run average cost curve
and a long-run average cost curve. The technical focus here is due to the current lack of cost data.
13 Johansen’s definition is equivalent to the current FAO definition of capacity agreed upon by researchers
representing several nations at a Technical Working Group meeting. It is also equivalent to that offered by
Christy (1996), Prochaska (1978), and the Federal Fisheries Investment Task Force Report to Congress.
14 In this paper, the variable inputs are given by crew size, days at sea, and tow duration. Fixed inputs
are given by vessel length, tonnage, and horsepower.Effects of the American Fisheries Act 187
put endowments. Possible specifications include the maximum theoretical variable
input levels (such as operating 24 hours a day, 365 days a year), the maximum ob-
served levels of each individual vessel, or the maximum observed variable input lev-
els of all vessels with similar fixed input endowment. The approach taken here is to
use the last specification, which most closely represents what is done in the DEA
program. Thus, catcher-processors will be grouped according to their size (less than
230 feet in length or greater than or equal to 230 feet in length), and the maximum
variable input use for each group will be used as to represent their unrestricted lev-
els.15 Note that this choice also makes the SPF and DEA models more similar and
comparable, thus increasing the ability to examine the robustness of estimates under
alternative stochastic and non-stochastic specifications.
DEA Specifications
Turning the focus to the DEA specification, as described in Färe, Grosskopf, and
Lovell (1985, 1994) and Coelli, Rao, and Battese (1998), the following output-ori-
ented DEA linear program computes the technically efficient output:
max(, ) θ θ z (1)
subject to the following restrictions:
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The “activity levels” (zj) of y and x are the weights for the points on the linear seg-
ments that define the frontier, where j = number of observations. The first three con-
straints ensure that the observed output bundles stay on or within the feasible set, while
the last constraint allows for variable returns to scale (VRS). A VRS approach is used
here to ensure that each vessel is only benchmarked against vessels of similar size, as
projected points for vessels below the frontier are formed as a convex (rather than
linear) combination of frontier observations (Coelli, Rao, and Battese 1998).
The value of the parameter θ  is the reciprocal of the output distance function,
Do(x,y), and therefore provides a measure of the possible (radial) increase in outputs un-
der full TE. Using the results from the program above, which is solved for each vessel in
the data, one can determine the technically efficient output for each vessel by scaling
observed output levels by θ . For example, an objective value of θ  = 1.1 indicates that a
vessel’s technically efficient output equals 1.1 times its current observed output vector.
Although DEA models were originally designed to measure TE, FGK proposed
15 The 230-foot vessel length was not chosen arbitrarily or in accordance to some federal or ADF&G
size classification. Rather, the data elicited a distinct natural break between size classes at 230 feet.Felthoven 188
a variation of the standard DEA model, given above, that was explicitly designed to
provide measures of capacity output and utilization corresponding to Johansen’s
“unrestricted” definition of capacity discussed earlier. To implement the FGK DEA
model, one computes the maximum proportionate increase in outputs, φ , when vari-
able inputs are allowed to vary, but fixed inputs are held at observed values. The fol-
lowing output-oriented linear program also allows for VRS:
max(,,) φλ φ z (2)
subject to the following restrictions:
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The variable factors are denoted by  ˆ α , the fixed factors are denoted by α . Be-
cause each vessel’s use of variable inputs is not restricted to their observed levels in
the FGK model, the third constraint involving λ  is incorporated, telling one the nec-
essary variable input use required to achieve frontier output levels. Note also that to
be on the frontier in the FGK model, vessels must have produced the most output for
a given level of fixed inputs. Firms that are not on the frontier may be below it be-
cause they are either using fixed inputs inefficiently, or because they are using lower
levels of variable inputs than frontier vessels (or both).
Using the results from the program above, one obtains vessel-level capacity es-
timates by scaling each vessel’s observed output vector by its estimated value of φ  —
here termed a capacity score, similar to θ  in the standard TE model. Estimates of capac-
ity for the fleet or fishery as a whole are obtained by summing the capacity estimates of
all individual vessels.16 In addition, CU scores for each vessel may be constructed
through the ratio of θ /φ . This ratio provides a measure of CU that reflects the potential
increase in output solely from increased variable input use, not from increased tech-
nical inefficiency.17 The interested reader should see FGK (1989) for further details.
16 In the presence of stock or congestion externalities, fleet capacity may be less than the sum of indi-
vidual vessel capacities.
17 Primal CU measures have typically been constructed as CU = Yobserved/Ycapacity. However, if Yobserved is
lower than Ycapacity primarily because of technical inefficiency, then the CU measure’s interpretation be-
comes confounded. By constructing CU = Ytechnically efficient/Ycapacity = θ /φ , as done here and developed in
FGK, the interpretation of CU measures is clearer, and reflects only increases in output from increased
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SPF Specification
The SPF approach uses a parametric model to econometrically fit the frontier of
technologies while simultaneously disentangling observed deviations from the fron-
tier into two parts: random variation or noise and productive inefficiency. The func-
tional representation of production technologies in SPF models has typically been
limited to single output production functions, but will be expanded here to accom-
modate the multiple output technology through use of a ray production function.
The familiar single output SPF model (see Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000) typi-
cally expresses production technologies in terms of:
yf e it it it = ( ; ) exp{ }; x ββ⋅ (3)
eu v it it it =+ , −
where y is the output, f(·) is a functional representation of the production technol-
ogy, x is a vector of inputs, βββββ  is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and e is a
random error term. Note that actual output, y, may differ from potential output due
the observed error, e, which is usually specified as including two components.
The first component represents differences between observed and potential out-
put due to inefficient input use, and is denoted by u. The second component, v, is
attributed to purely random variations in output (unrelated to inefficient factor use),
analogous to the error term in standard regression models. In fisheries contexts,
such random errors are often attributed to weather conditions, variations in stock
conditions, luck, or possibly introduced by measurement error.
In this paper, it is assumed that v is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
N(0, σ v
2) random variable, and u is distributed as a truncation at zero of the N(mit, σ u
2)
distribution, where mit = Σ i Dit · δ i, and Dit is a dummy variable equal to one for the ith
vessel in each period, zero otherwise. This approach makes use of the panel nature of the
current data set, allowing for TE estimates that reflect potentially different efficiency
levels and patterns and for each vessel. See Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, p. 83) and
Coelli, Rao and Battese (1988, p. 235) for further discussions on this specification.
An additional parameter, γ , is introduced here in order to ease the maximum
likelihood estimation (MLE) of the variance parameters. First, a “combined” vari-
ance is constructed in terms of the random error and inefficiency term, given by
σ s
2 = σ v
2 + σ u
2. Next, the parameter γ  is defined as γ  = σ u
2/σ s
2. This
reparameterization allows one to undertake a grid search for γ , which, by definition,
must lie between 0 and 1, which is much easier than attempting to estimate σ v
2 and
σ u
2 individually (which may lead to negative variances in some cases).
Two alternative functional representations that allow for a multi-output primal
specification are the distance function and the ray production function (to be defined
shortly). They also allow for the two-part error decomposition discussed in the previous
single output model. While these two functions differ in the way they are imple-
mented, either can be used to estimate technically efficient output and construct esti-
mates of capacity. However, difficulties often arise when using the stochastic output
distance function in applications in which there are zero-valued outputs.18
18 The problems arise because a lack of data on the dependent variable [Do(x,y)] prohibits one from di-
rectly estimating the model. The approach typically used to overcome this problem is to recognize the
linear output homogeneity of the distance function, which generates the equality Do(x,λ y) = λ  Do(x,y).
Next, λ  is specified as the inverse of either one of the outputs,  yi
− 1, or the Euclidean norm of the output
vector, ||y||–1, and logs are taken. The result is an equality that now has an observable left-hand side vari-
able for estimation: –ln||y|| = ln Do(x,y/||y||) – ln Do(x,y). However, for any observation in which yi is equal to
zero, the logarithm of the right-hand side variable is undefined, precluding estimation of the model.Felthoven 190
Such problems are avoided here by utilizing a different, but equivalent, repre-
sentation of the technology that is not subject to problems with zero-valued outputs:
the stochastic ray production function (Löthgren 1997). The ray production function
model is derived by augmenting the standard, single output production given by:
fx y R y Yx ( , ) max : ( , ) , ΩΩ =∈ ∈ {} + (4)
where x ∈ RN
+ , Y(x, Ω ) is the producible output set, and Ω  includes all regulatory
variables and stock information in each period (e.g., abundance, fish size and age
distribution, and fish spatial and temporal distribution). Information on Ω  in the cur-
rent application is limited to annual Bering Sea stock estimates for each of the
fleets’ primary catch (pollock, flatfish, Pacific cod), since for the most part, regula-
tory effects are difficult to quantify, and thus, will be viewed as a latent variable that
impacts the shape and location of Y(x, Ω ), following Weninger (2001). This single-
output representation is transformed into a multiple-output generalization of the pro-
duction function by expressing the output vector of a multi-output technology in po-
lar-coordinate form:
yy =⋅ m() . θ (5)
This form for y implies that the multiple-output ray production function takes the form:
fR m Y ( , , ) max : ( ) ( , ) . xy y x θθ ΩΩ =∈ ⋅ ∈ {} + (6)
Here, y ∈ RM
+ , ||y|| is the Euclidean norm of the output vector [||y|| = () / Σ i
m
i y = 1
21 2 ], θ
represents the polar-coordinate angles of the output vector (rather than the standard
rectangular coordinates), and the function m: [0, π /2]M–1 →  [0,1]M is defined in terms
of the output polar-coordinate angles as:
mi M ii j j
i ( ) cos sin , , , , θθ θ == … =
− ∏ 0
1 1 (7)
where sinθ 0 = cosθ M = 1. The vector of polar-coordinate angles θ  (which are used in

























While the conventional single-output production function given in equation (4)
represents the maximum output obtainable from a given bundle of inputs, the mul-
tiple output ray production function in equation (6) represents the maximum (frontier)
output norm obtainable given inputs and the observed output mix (as represented by the
output polar coordinates).19 In addition, if Y(x, Ω ) satisfies standard assumptions, the ray
19 The polar coordinate angles (θ ) represent the curvature of the production frontier, which may be de-
rived from the partial derivatives of the ray function with respect to the polar-coordinate angles,
∂f(x, θ )/∂θ i, i = 1, …, M – 1.Effects of the American Fisheries Act 191
function is positively monotonic in inputs, or f(x”, θ , Ω ) ≥  f(x’, θ , Ω  ), ∀ x” ≥  x’.20
To model the technology in the context of the SPF framework discussed earlier,
the link between the ray production function and the output distance function can be
exploited to allow for a natural decomposition of inefficiency and random error.
This relationship is easily derived by recognizing that, by definition, the output dis-
tance function represents the ratio of the observed output norm to the frontier output












which can be rearranged to yield:
yx x y =⋅ fD (,, ) (, ) . θΩ 0 (10)
One may then specify equation (10) as in the standard SPF framework in equation
(3) by including a symmetric, multiplicative random error term, exp(ν), and repre-
senting the output distance function as Do(x,y) = exp(–u) (which, as required by
theory, is bounded between zero and one):
yx =⋅ + fu v ( , , ) exp{– }. θΩ (11)
Estimation can then proceed just as with the single-output framework once a suit-
able flexible functional form is chosen for f(x, θ , Ω ). The form chosen here was the
translog:21
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where the vector z includes each of the m – 1 polar coordinate angles (θ ’s), the n
fixed and variable inputs, m annual species stock indices (each species-specific
stock estimate was normalized relative to 1994), and a time variable (t) to capture/
represent potential technological change. As mentioned earlier, the inefficiency
component of residuals, uit, was parameterized as uit = Σ i Dit · δ i, where Dit is a
dummy variable equal to one for the ith vessel in each period, zero otherwise.22
Vessel-level TE scores [estimates of Do(x,y)], can be computed as TEit =
E[exp(–uit)| eit]. Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) provide further details on the specific
formula used in the conditional expectation and the likelihood function for the MLE
procedure.
Once the ray frontier model has been estimated, capacity estimates are obtained
by evaluating the efficient frontier at the maximal levels of variable inputs discussed
20 Specifically, if inputs are strongly disposable (meaning that if a given input bundle can produce a cer-
tain level of output, then a larger bundle of inputs can also produce that output), then input monotonicity
holds (see Löthgren 1997).
21 Note that even though a logarithmic form is used to approximate equation (11), there are no problems
in the case of zero-valued outputs, as log (θ i |yi = 0) is well defined [see equation (8)].
22 One of the vessel dummies was excluded to avoid the “dummy variable trap,” so there are 29 dummy
parameter estimates and a standard intercept for the inefficiency parameterization.Felthoven 192
earlier. And, with individual vessel capacity estimates in hand, estimates for the
fleet as a whole are computed by summing capacity output for each vessel in the
fleet for each species caught. These computations result in an estimate of the fishing
capacity for each different species in the fishery. In addition, just as with the DEA
models, CU measures will be constructed as the ratio of technically efficient output










Data, Model Specification, and Discussion of Results
Both SPF and DEA models were estimated according to the techniques discussed in
the previous sections using 180 observations representing annual catch for 30 ves-
sels over 1994–2000 (some vessels did not participate in all years). The models in-
cluded three outputs and nine inputs. Specifically, outputs were specified as total an-
nual catch of pollock, flatfish, and Pacific cod;23 “variable inputs” were specified by
total annual days at sea, annual tow duration (in hours) and annual crew (in man-
weeks); “fixed inputs” were represented by vessel length, tonnage, and horsepower;
and “non-discretionary inputs” were given by annual stock estimates (for pollock,
flatfish, and Pacific cod). Data for these variables were obtained from the NMFS
“blend,” federal observer program, weekly processing reports, federal vessel and
ADF&G registration files, U.S. Coast Guard data, and the 2000 NMFS Stock As-
sessment and Fishery Evaluation (SAFE) report.
Estimating the SPF model involved testing several restricted forms of the
translog model24 with generalized likelihood ratio tests. The results indicated that
the null hypothesis of a restricted version of the full translog specification could not
be rejected as an appropriate representation of the ray frontier function. This re-
stricted specification included the linear and squared terms of the variables dis-
cussed above, but omitted some of the cross-terms involving vessel tonnage, tow du-
ration, days at sea, and stock indices.25 The parameter estimates, standard errors, and
asymptotic t-ratios associated with the final specification are given in table 1. An-
nual mean values for data used in the analysis for 1994–2000 are given in table 2.
As discussed earlier, the capacity estimates developed within the SPF and DEA
models reflect potential increases in output due to increased TE and CU. For this
reason, a discussion of the TE and CU measures underlying the capacity estimates
will be provided first. Note that the values of corresponding DEA and SPF measures
do differ slightly for each vessel, as would be expected when employing different
23 These three species groups were incorporated because each comprised greater than 5% of total catch in
each year. Any species not meeting this minimum requirement was not included in the model. It should be
noted that prohibited species catch (halibut, salmon, crab, herring) can, at times, affect targeting strategies
(when bycatch caps are met), and in turn, efficiency, even though the overall level of catch is very low rela-
tive to target catch. However, due to difficulties in ascertaining which observations occurred when bycatch
caps were binding (or approaching the cap level), prohibited species bycatch was not included in the model.
24 The restricted forms that were tested were a purely linear relationship, a form with only linear and
cross terms, a form with only linear and squared terms included, and a combination of the latter two
restricted forms.
25 In initial runs, the cross terms involving these variables were invariably insignificant and in some
cases, resulted in output elasticities of incorrect sign (violating curvature conditions). Once the cross
terms were omitted from the model (after generalized likelihood ratio tests verified their lack of signifi-
cance), all expected monotonicity conditions were met.Effects of the American Fisheries Act 193
Table 1
Stochastic Ray Production Function Parameter Estimates
Parameter Coefficient Standard Error Asymp. T-Ratio
β 0 ; intercept –9.770 0.988 –9.888
β 1 ; ln(θ 1) 6.567 1.265 5.191
β 2 ; ln(θ 2) 2.371 1.041 2.278
β 3 ; ln(length) 0.663 1.820 0.364
β 4 ; ln(tonnage) 0.507 0.368 1.377
β 5 ; ln(hp) 3.920 0.783 5.008
β 6 ; ln(duration) 0.999 0.509 1.962
β 7 ; ln(crew) –1.058 0.818 –1.293
β 8 ; ln(days) 0.338 0.159 2.121
β 9 ;  ln(pollock index) 10.322 0.742 13.915
β 10; ln(P.cod index) 0.693 2.696 0.257
β 11; ln(flatfish index) 35.806 0.385 92.890
β 12; ln(t) 3.184 0.106 30.144
β 13 ; ln(θ 1 · θ 2) 2.527 0.910 2.777
β 14 ; ln(θ 1 · length) 1.370 0.689 1.989
β 15 ; ln(θ 1 · hp) –1.171 0.282 –4.149
β 16 ; ln(θ 1 · crew) –0.198 0.103 –1.914
β 17 ; ln(θ 1 · t) –0.046 0.019 –2.422
β 18 ; ln(θ 2 · length) 0.585 1.643 0.356
β 19 ; ln(θ 2 · hp) –0.826 0.566 –1.460
β 20 ; ln(θ 2 · crew) 0.806 0.411 1.958
β 21 ; ln(θ 2 · t) –0.194 0.086 –2.252
β 22 ; ln(length · hp) 0.034 0.342 0.101
β 23 ; ln(length · crew) –0.381 0.209 –1.823
β 24; ln(hp · crew) 0.068 0.126 0.536
β 25; ln(crew · t) –0.029 0.014 –2.071
β 26; ln(pollock index · P.cod index) 17.102 1.195 14.307
β 27; ln(pollock index · flat index) 8.458 1.258 6.721
β 28; ln(P.cod index · flat index) 42.218 1.457 28.975
β 29; [ln(θ 1)]2 1.988 0.176 11.313
β 30; [ln(θ 2)]2 –0.302 0.230 –1.317
β 31; [ln(length)]2 0.026 0.885 0.029
β 32; [ln(tonnage)]2 –0.087 0.067 –1.295
β 33; [ln(hp)]2 –0.343 0.207 –1.656
β 34; [ln(duration)]2 –0.187 0.098 –1.899
β 35; [ln(crew)]2 0.242 0.154 1.575
β 36; [ln(days)]2 –0.210 0.201 –1.045
β 37; [ln(pollock index)]2 –7.832 1.322 –5.923
β 38; [ln(P.cod index)]2 –47.700 1.138 –41.911
β 39; [ln(flat index)]2 100.798 1.031 97.727
β 40; [ln(t)]2 –0.235 0.026 –8.920
σ 2 0.020 0.003 6.009
γ 0.739 0.051 14.537
δ 0 –0.338 0.194 –1.743
δ 1 0.854 0.238 3.591
δ 2 0.762 0.256 2.980
δ 3 0.967 0.219 4.411
δ 4 0.354 0.265 1.336
δ 5 0.776 0.224 3.468
δ 6 0.597 0.217 2.747
δ 7 0.546 0.220 2.488
δ 8 0.621 0.210 2.959Felthoven 194
empirical techniques, but the relative values of the DEA and SPF measures for each
vessel are quite similar. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient26 between DEA
and SPF TE scores is 0.84, and the coefficient between the corresponding CU scores
is 0.92. Note also that the patterns exhibited among the groups and time periods to
be compared are essentially always the same for the two approaches — a somewhat
comforting result. Therefore, the following discussion will reference the overall
trends in average values of TE and CU without explicitly recognizing minor differ-
ences in the values of the SPF and DEA estimates.27
The results in table 2 illustrate the annual changes that occurred in a variety of
areas. Technical harvesting efficiency generally increased over the sample period,
and markedly so in the second year after the AFA was implemented.28 The same can
be said for CU, which had its lowest value in 1995 and peaked in 2000. There was
also an increase in the percentage of boats with meal plants onboard, a result likely
due to the improved retention and utilization requirements for pollock and cod in
1998. The presence of a meal plant onboard seems to also be correlated with deci-
Table 1 (continued)
Stochastic Ray Production Function Parameter Estimates
Parameter Coefficient Standard Error Asymp. T-Ratio
δ 9 0.276 0.280 0.986
δ 10 0.574 0.215 2.667
δ 11 0.494 0.211 2.339
δ 12 0.295 0.250 1.180
δ 13 0.472 0.223 2.115
δ 14 –0.179 1.081 –0.166
δ 15 –0.424 0.635 –0.667
δ 16 0.556 0.221 2.520
δ 17 0.130 0.444 0.292
δ 18 0.272 0.274 0.995
δ 19 –0.608 0.619 –0.983
δ 20 0.261 0.328 0.794
δ 21 0.775 0.206 3.754
δ 22 –0.653 0.461 –1.415
δ 23 0.526 0.226 2.328
δ 24 0.705 0.215 3.281
δ 25 0.321 0.259 1.240
δ 26 0.980 0.226 4.346
δ 27 0.677 0.203 3.334
δ 28 0.633 0.219 2.887
δ 29 0.710 0.202 3.513
26 The Spearman rank correlation coefficient was computed as S = 1 – [6*Σ i(Ri – Qi) / n(n2 – 1)], where
Ri is the rank of vessel i in the SPF rankings (ranked according to either TE or CU scores), Qi is the rank
of vessel i in the DEA rankings, and n is the number of observations.
27 The average values of TE and CU for the sample and specific sub-samples (such as AFA-eligible ves-
sels, AFA-ineligible vessels, AFA-eligible/active, etc.) are computed using weighted arithmetic means,
as suggested in Färe and Zelenyuk (2002). In particular, each vessel i’s weight was calculated as




jm = == 1 11 [ ( )], ΣΣ  where M = number of outputs and J = number of vessels.
28 As mentioned earlier in the paper, the observed performance changes in 1999 are likely to be much
less evident than those in 2000, as vessel owners did not have much time to change the structure of op-































































































































































































sions over vessel buyouts in 1999 and the choices to idle AFA-eligible vessels in
1999 and 2000.
The average per-vessel catch of pollock increased by 20% in 1999, and rose
again in 2000 by an additional 25% (though the total apportionment of catch to
these vessels actually fell by 42% in 1999 and then increased only 16% in 2000).
These per-vessel increases can be attributed to the exit of nine vessels in 1998, the
idling of AFA-eligible vessels within multi-vessel companies, and the sale of quota
from one AFA-eligible vessel to the PCC. The average days at sea also increased
from past levels in 1999, and reached an historical peak of 140 days in 2000. The
per-vessel averages for towing duration and annual crew use exhibited a similar
trend. These changes in season length and annual effort are likely results of de-
creases in the number of participants and an absence of the former race for fish.
Table 3 provides the capacity estimates that result from scaling up observed
catch to reflect potential increases from heightened TE and CU. Focusing on pol-
lock, the average of DEA and SPF technical capacity estimates reached a peak of
nearly 1.1 million tons in 1994, dropping to around 880,000 tons in 1998. In 1999,
post-AFA, pollock capacity dropped by around 300,000 tons, nearly a 35% decline
(rising slightly from this level in 2000). At the same time, total catch (and capacity)
for Pacific cod and flatfish was cut in half from previous historical levels and fell
again in 2000 (though much more significantly for Pacific cod than flatfish).
Table 3 also shows how the total “effort” (days, duration, crew) and “capital
stock” (tons, length, horsepower) variables have changed since the AFA was imple-
mented (where each of the inputs comprising “effort” are summed over all vessels
for all weeks in the year). Generally, the total fishery effort variables fell by around
30% in 1999, and rose slightly in 2000. Total capital stock variables for the fleet re-
flect the sum of each of the vessel characteristics over all vessels that participated in
the fishery in each year. While these representations of capital are admittedly crude
Table 3
Yearly Totals for the Pollock Catcher-Processor Fleet, 1994–2000
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Pollock catch (tons) 647,203 628,334 594,508 582,588 598,440 413,340 483,907
Pacific cod catch 13,432 19,659 23,376 24,973 25,044 13,897 6,937
Flatfish catch 35,403 36,439 47,750 42,297 27,304 15,505 14,607
SPF Pollock capacity 1,086,901 948,871 866,749 932,710 925,185 534,824 572,306
DEA Pollock capacity 1,106,769 963,332 872,238 812,464 839,102 565,933 554,051
SPF Pacific cod capacity 23,807 35,643 34,934 39,681 39,597 21,171 10,863
DEA Pacific cod capacity 22,663 30,617 32,536 32,273 34,684 16,302 7,552
SPF flatfish capacity 50,889 60,168 59,697 54,540 38,200 25,157 18,448
DEA flatfish capacity 48,625 51,386 58,393 50,014 31,039 26,147 15,116
Days at sea (vessel-days) 3,609 3,418 3,449 2,830 3,166 2,030 2,232
Tow duration (hours) 47,132 39,715 42,947 35,545 38,414 21,373 25,692
Crew (man-weeks) 52,021 51,297 55,382 47,275 50,911 34,787 37,529
Number of active vessels 29 29 29 29 29 17 16
Registered tonnage 42,512 42,252 41,355 41,355 41,621 29,331 27,181
Length (feet) 7,743 7,743 7,519 7,519 7,553 4,817 4,539
Horsepower 149,670 146,795 142,895 145,820 147,020 97,220 91,920Effects of the American Fisheries Act 197
29 In addition, it is fairly common to use measures of vessel length, tonnage, and horsepower as proxies
for capital.
30 For example, the average of DEA and SPF TE scores for eligible vessels is 0.8659, and the average
for ineligible vessels is 0.8018. Thus, for a given vessel size and effort level, Yeligible/0.8659 = Y*, and
Yineligible/0.8018 = Y*, or Yeligible = 1.08·Yineligible.
31 The DEA scores show a greater amount of variation from year to year relative to the SPF scores. The
lowest SPF score only differs from the highest by 0.083, while the lowest DEA score is 0.108 less than
the highest. This result is to be expected, as DEA is more sensitive to year-to-year changes, while SPF
models tend to smooth out such shocks to some degree. See Coelli, Rao, and Battese (1998, p. 240) for
further discussion of this issue.
and ignore processing equipment onboard, they do provide a rough indication of the
aggregate “fishing power” and likely provide more information than merely stating
the number of vessels that participated.29 These measures of capital peaked in 1994
and were at their lowest in 2000. As with some of the previously discussed mea-
sures, this decline is mainly attributable to the AFA buyback and the idling of ves-
sels in 1999 and 2000.
It should be evident at this point that some marked changes occurred in this
fleet after the AFA was implemented. However, it is not entirely clear at first glance
whether the increases in TE and CU occurred because the decommissioned vessels
were historically lower in these areas than continuing vessels, or if the continuing
vessels’ TE and CU rates sharply increased because of provisions in the AFA. There-
fore, it is instructive to analyze the historical relative performance of the AFA-eli-
gible and AFA-ineligible vessels from 1994–98 to see how they fared relative to one
another. In addition, the TE and CU of the AFA-eligible, non-idled vessels will be
analyzed from 1994–2000 to see if their performance changed after 1998 relative to
the past. Each of these questions will now be addressed in turn.
Table 4 provides a comparison of the average values of different measures for
each of the AFA-eligible and AFA-ineligible groups. While the CU levels for eli-
gible vessels are only slightly higher than those of ineligible vessels, the differences
in TE are larger, by about 0.064, on average. This implies that comparably sized eli-
gible vessels produced, on average, about 8% more output than the ineligible vessels
for a given level of effort for 1994–98.30 However, the eligible vessels were, on av-
erage, much larger and more powerful than the ineligible vessel (and thus had
greater mean catch levels for pollock). One potential cause of the greater TE exhib-
ited by the (larger) eligible vessels could be scale efficiencies; elasticity of scale es-
timates from the SPF model, computed as the sum of output elasticities (Σ i ∂ln||y||/
∂lnxi), indicate the presence of increasing returns to scale.
The additional question of whether the non-idled, eligible vessels exhibited in-
creased TE and CU after implementation of the AFA can be addressed by examining
table 5. For this subset of vessels, the TE estimates from the DEA and SPF models
differ more in magnitude than the previous comparisons, but both indicate that tech-
nical harvesting efficiency did not increase significantly post-AFA.31 However, CU
does appear to have increased; markedly so in 2000.
There are at least two potential explanations for why the pre-AFA TE scores
tend to be larger than the post-AFA scores for this subset of vessels. First, after
1997, improved retention and utilization requirements for pollock and cod dictated
that meal production became an integral part of processing. While decreasing dis-
cards overall, this activity slows down the harvesting-processing chain more than
simply discarding undesirable catch. Such effects compounded with increasing
Steller sea lion closures could have offset some of the potential gains in harvesting
efficiency afforded by the post-AFA changes. Second, it is possible that such poten-
tial gains in harvesting efficiency were small; most of the perceived gains of the
AFA seem to be related to processing and the associated increases in product recov-Felthoven 198
Table 4
Comparisons of Average Values Among AFA-Ineligible and Eligible Vessels, 1994–98
AFA-Ineligible AFA-Eligible
SPF Do(x,y) (efficiency) 0.7963 0.8364
DEA Do(x,y) (efficiency) 0.8072 0.8953
SPF capacity utilization 0.8466 0.8643
DEA capacity utilization 0.8666 0.8861
% of vessels with meal plants 10% 60%
Pollock catch 15,287 24,086
Pacific cod catch 1,178 555
Flatfish catch 623 1,411
Days at sea (vessel-days) 115 115
Tow duration (hours) 1,461 1,371
Crew (man-weeks) 1,612 1,899
Registered tonnage 670 1,736
Length (feet) 217 278
Horsepower 3,939 5,500
Table 5
Average Values Among Non-Idled AFA-Eligible Vessels, 1994–2000
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
SPF Do(x,y) (efficiency) 0.861 0.865 0.896 0.813 0.839 0.863 0.851
DEA Do(x,y) (efficiency) 0.906 0.871 0.913 0.901 0.925 0.847 0.955
SPF capacity utilization 0.890 0.902 0.911 0.810 0.881 0.905 0.942
DEA capacity utilization 0.865 0.862 0.928 0.861 0.935 0.924 0.969
Pollock catch 26,487 26,340 25,028 25,914 25,104 26,864 32,252
Pacific cod catch 298 420 533 770 649 642 214
Flatfish catch 945 1,361 2,251 1,231 1,303 927 960
Days at sea (vessel-days) 111 115 119 95 111 127 144
Tow duration (hours) 1,380 1,342 1,473 1,186 1,367 1,372 1,665
Crew (man-weeks) 1,813 2,009 2,125 1,783 1,959 2,208 2,457
Registered tonnage 1,783 1,766 1,766 1,766 1,766 1,766 1,766
Length (feet) 283 283 283 283 283 283 283
Horsepower 5,831 5,640 5,640 5,835 5,835 5,835 5,835Effects of the American Fisheries Act 199
32 The product recovery rates are reported to have increased by 26% during 1999 over the 1998 baseline,
and by 35% in 2000 relative to 1998 (NMFS 2001).
ery rates and product grades.32 In fact, it is likely that tradeoffs were made between
harvesting efficiency and the quality of processed products, as evidenced by the ob-
served slowdown of operations. However, since the present analysis does not ac-
count for differences in processing efficiency and quality, or for increases in the size
and quality of the raw catch, only the effects on physical harvesting efficiency are
evident.
An additional question to be examined is how the AFA-eligible vessels that
were active in 1999 or 2000 differed from the idle, eligible vessels. In particular,
one might wonder if the TE and CU scores constructed here could be used as an in-
dicator of which vessels were likely to be idled within a company (in situations
where a company owned multiple vessels). To examine this question, table 6 pre-
sents a variety of average measures for the two groups of vessels (AFA eligible/idled
and AFA-eligible/active) over the periods prior to implementation of the AFA.
With regard to technical harvesting efficiency, the active vessels’ average TE
scores exceeded idled vessels’ corresponding scores by about 0.12, on average, from
1994–98, producing approximately 15% more than idled vessels for a given vessel
size and effort level. The CU scores of active vessels also exceeded those of the
idled vessels for the 1994–98 period, by an average of around 0.1 for the SPF and
DEA models. These findings together suggest that the vessels that were active post-
AFA had historically caught more fish for a given vessel size and effort level than
did vessels that were idled post-AFA, and that the active vessels exerted consider-
ably more fishing effort than similarly sized idled vessels for the 1994–98 period.
While the available data does not provide detailed information why the AFA-active
Table 6
Comparison of Averages Among AFA-Eligible/Idled
and AFA-Eligible/Active Vessels 1994–98
AFA-Eligible/Idled AFA-Eligible/Active
SPF Do(x,y) (efficiency) 0.7365 0.8721
DEA Do(x,y) (efficiency) 0.8211 0.9199
SPF capacity utilization 0.7860 0.8912
DEA capacity utilization 0.8198 0.9081
% of vessels with meal plants 20% 70%
Pollock catch 16,229 25,770
Pacific cod catch 198 631
Flatfish catch 2,306 1,219
Days at sea (vessel-days) 113 116
Tow duration (hours) 1,368 1,372
Crew (man-weeks) 1,447 1,996
Registered tonnage 1,900 1,701
Length (feet) 254 284
Horsepower 4,604 5,692Felthoven 200
vessels had been utilized to a greater degree prior to the AFA, information regarding
the existence of a meal plant onboard does provide an additional possible reason
certain vessels were idled. Only 20% of the AFA-idled vessels had meal plants on
board, while 70% of the AFA-active vessels had the capability to produce meal.
To more formally evaluate the predictive power of the CU and TE scores in
idling or eligibility decisions, logit models were run. The premise of these regres-
sions was that the observed choices could be explained by TE and CU scores. A
dummy variable for the ability to produce meal was also included in the models, as
this factor may have been important in such decisions and was not included in the
original frontier models.33 Table 7 shows the result of four logit models for the fol-
lowing four choices: (i) AFA-eligible vs. AFA-ineligible; (ii) eligible-active vs. eli-
gible-idled; (iii) eligible-active vs. eligible-idled for just company 1; and (iv) eli-
gible-active vs. eligible-idled for just company 2.34
The general results of the models indicate that the predictive power of the TE
and CU scores (and meal producing ability) is good. These factors led to correct pre-
dictions 78% of the time for eligible vs. ineligible status, with TE scores and meal
capability contributing significantly (CU scores were highly insignificant here). For
the active or idled status of AFA-eligible vessels, the logit model had 85% of the
predictions correct and was significantly influenced by CU and meal capability.
A similar level of predictive power emerged when models were run comparing
an individual company’s idled/active vessels, yielding correct predictions for 83%
of the observations for company 1, and 74% correct for company 2. Within company
1, two vessels were idled. According to both the DEA and SPF models, one of these
vessels exhibited the lowest TE score for all vessels in that company for 1994–98. It
is also lacking a meal plant, is relatively small, and exhibited less than average CU
relative to the other vessels in the company. The other idled vessel, however, is not
quite as obvious a candidate for idling. For example, it does have meal capability
and ranks among the highest in TE scores according to the SPF model (and near the
middle for DEA). Instead, it is the CU scores that point to this vessel as a potentially
less desirable vessel to operate; both SPF and DEA scores indicate that this vessel
has, by far, the lowest historical utilization rate of all vessels in the company. This
result could be due to age, lack of amenities on board, processing inflexibility, or a
host of other factors. Still, one might think that a vessel that was utilized relatively
little in the past may not be as useful to a company looking to diminish their active
fleet size.
Turning to the company 2, one finds that three vessels were idled in 1999 or
2000. According to both the SPF and DEA models, these three vessels exhibited the
lowest TE scores in the company (two of which are especially low). Exacerbating
this potential shortcoming is a lack of meal plants onboard for any of these three
vessels and the presence of meal capability for all other active vessels. The CU
scores for these vessels seem a bit less consistently informative with regard to the
idling decision than with the former company, as the CU scores are near the lowest
for two of the three vessels, but relatively high for the other. This result is also sup-
ported in the logit model for company 2, in which the coefficient on CU was highly
insignificant.
It should be noted that the discussion of the relative CU and TE scores up to this
point has made little mention of whether two groups were “significantly” different.
33 The meal dummy was not included in the company-specific idled/active regressions, as a vessel’s sta-
tus was perfectly predicted by the presence of a meal plant when included in the model, prohibiting con-
vergence.
34 There were only two companies that had multiple vessels and chose to idle one or more of them. For
confidentiality reasons, we will refer to them as company one and company two.Effects of the American Fisheries Act 201
While remarks have been made regarding differences in magnitude of measures for
two groups or time periods, no formal statistical tests have been conducted on
whether the differences are significant relative to the overall variation in the esti-
mates. In order to examine these issues more formally, and to solidify the findings
of the previous discussion, hypothesis tests were carried out regarding the equality
of TE and CU scores for several comparisons of interest. In particular, tests for
equality of means (for TE and CU) were carried out for the following groups: AFA-
eligible and AFA-ineligible vessels, AFA-eligible/active vessels before and after the
AFA was implemented, AFA-eligible/active and AFA-eligible/idled vessels, vessels
with and without meal plants, and inter-company comparisons.
To carry out these tests, the two-step method (Ray 1991; Fizel and Nunnikhoven
Table 7
Logit Models of AFA-Eligible/AFA-Ineligible and Idled/Active Status
Eligible vs. Ineligible
Number Obs. = 147 % Correct Predictions = 0.782 R-squared = 0.253
Parameter Estimate Standard Error T-Statistic P-value ∂Prob./∂ xi
α –1.770 1.200 –1.473 0.140 –0.282
α meal plant 2.242 0.576 3.890 0.000 0.357
β CU –0.483 1.241 –0.389 0.697 –0.077
β Do 2.860 1.331 2.147 0.032 0.455
Eligible-Active vs. Eligible-Idled
Number Obs. = 103 % Correct Predictions = 0.845 R-squared = 0.373
Parameter Estimate Standard Error T-Statistic P-value ∂Prob./∂ xi
α –5.233 1.900 –2.754 0.006 –0.644
α meal plant 2.894 0.693 4.171 0.000 0.356
β CU 4.147 1.836 2.258 0.024 0.511
β Do 1.879 1.749 1.073 0.283 0.231
Eligible-Active vs. Eligible-Idled — Company 1
Number Obs. = 35 % Correct Predictions = 0.829 R-squared = 0.585
Parameter Estimate Standard Error T-Statistic P-value ∂Prob./∂ xi
α –50.869 22.872 –2.224 0.026 –4.819
β CU 41.247 18.949 2.176 0.030 3.908
β Do 21.482 10.334 2.078 0.038 2.035
Eligible-Active vs. Eligible-Idled — Company 2
Number Obs. = 23 % Correct Predictions = 0.739 R-squared = 0.370
Parameter Estimate Standard Error T-Statistic P-value ∂Prob./∂ xi
α –10.396 4.603 –2.258 0.024 –1.661
β CU 4.426 3.983 1.110 0.267 0.707
β Do 9.222 3.926 2.348 0.019 1.474Felthoven 202
1992; and McCarty and Yaisawarng 1993; and Yu 1998) was employed.35 This ap-
proach involves regressing the TE (and CU) scores from a first-stage model upon
continuous or categorical uncontrollable variables in order to find explainable dif-
ferences among individuals or groups with different characteristics (that are not ex-
plicit inputs in the production process). Here, the TE and CU scores for two groups
or periods were regressed upon dummy variables for each of the groups or periods,
facilitating inference through statistical tests of whether the mean levels of TE or
CU are different.36 Because the TE and CU scores are truncated from below at one, a
Tobit model was used to conduct the regressions. Next, hypothesis tests for equality
of means (intercepts) between groups or periods of interest for the TE and CU
scores were conducted.
The results of the tests are given in table 8 and indicate the following: (i) the
historical TE of AFA-eligible vessels exceeded that of AFA-ineligible vessels; (ii)
the CU of AFA-eligible vessels increased post-AFA relative to past years; (iii) the
pre-AFA TE and CU of AFA-eligible/active vessels exceeded that of the AFA-eli-
gible/idle vessels; (iv) the TE of vessels with meal plants was greater than that of
vessels without meal plants; (v) the TE and CU scores of company 1’s idled vessels
were significantly lower than their active vessels; and (vi) the TE scores of idled
vessels within company 2 were significantly lower than their active vessels. The
motivations for, and potential repercussions from, these differences were provided
in earlier discussion.
While TE and CU levels provide only a small part of the information necessary
to assess overall vessel performance, as illustrated above, they can be useful in as-
sessing capacity and certain aspects of economic performance. In addition, owner’s
decisions to idle or operate a vessel — made by those best informed with regard to
the relative profitability of vessels — appear to be considerably correlated with the
TE and CU measures, which can be estimated using commonly available data in
Alaskan fisheries. However, as the meal capability factor illustrated, there are other
“real world” factors that must be considered along with these more abstract mea-
sures when analyzing the actions taken by vessel owners.
Conclusion
This paper analyzed the effects of the AFA on the TE, CU, and capacity of pollock
catcher-processors. The results indicate that the group of decommissioned vessels
exhibited a lower level of historical technical harvesting efficiency than AFA-eligible
vessels, and that the CU of the AFA-eligible vessels increased post-AFA. The historical
TE and CU of AFA-eligible, active vessels exceeded that of eligible, idled vessels, and
fishing capacity fell by more than 30% for the group of pollock catcher-processors.
In addition to the caveats placed on the extent to which these technological
measures characterize profitability, it is important to note the potential biases and
shortcomings of the existing measures. First, while efforts were made to incorporate
35 The two-stage approach was applied only to the DEA results because of the distributional assumptions
that are present in the SPF model. In particular, in the first stage it is assumed that the inefficiency ef-
fects are independently and identically distributed. The second-stage regression looks for firm- or
group-specific factors that explain the inefficiency effects, implying that the effects are not identically
distributed. While there are methods for carrying out statistical tests on SPF results (such as those out-
lined in Bera and Sharma (1999), or a Wilcoxian signed-rank test), they were not carried out due to the
conclusive results of the DEA tests and high degree of similarity between the DEA and SPF results.
36 These tests look only at the distribution of the resulting DEA estimates when analyzing the signifi-
cance of the differences in TE and CU among producers. Potential uncertainty regarding the first-stage
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as many of the inputs used in production for which data is available, the set included
in the model is not exhaustive. For example, vessel characteristic data is used as a
proxy for heterogeneous capital or fixed inputs. However, it is unlikely that each of
the vessels sharing the same length, tonnage, and horsepower has an identical, pro-
ductive capital stock.
Second, the effort variables (days at sea, tow duration, crew size) representing
“variable inputs” serve as proxies for the numerous inputs that are exhausted within
a trip. The most obvious result of omitting relevant inputs is that the efficiency com-
parisons in the models may be affected. For example, if two vessels used identical
levels of the observed inputs, but one vessel had much greater catch, the models
would give it a higher TE score. However, it may be the case that this vessel used
much more of another omitted input and is, thus, not more efficient than the other.
An additional issue of concern relates to possible misinterpretation of the capac-
ity estimates. As discussed in the introduction, these measures, while based on ob-
served production, are physical/technical measures and do not necessarily represent
what would be produced — just what could be produced. And further, what could be
produced if some captains were to increase harvesting efficiency to match other
similarly sized vessels, and/or increased the amount of time spent fishing to match
the levels exhibited by vessels similar in size.
It should also be emphasized that “full” capacity utilization (CU = 1) may not
represent cost-minimizing or profit-maximizing effort levels for any or all vessels,
and may not be realistically sustainable. That said, since the CU measures do pro-
vide an indication of how much one is attempting to get out of a vessel of a given
size, they are likely to have the greatest relevance in fisheries where there is almost
certainly excess capacity at the individual vessel level. In such cases, greater values
of CU are likely to be correlated with a more efficient allocation of fixed inputs.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the relative levels of TE estimated in
the models represent only a portion of the factors that determine the profitability of
a vessel. The measures constructed here examine how close a vessel lies to a pro-
duction possibilities frontier, but ignore where the observed output mix is relative to
a point of tangency between output shadow values and the iso-revenue surface
(which determines the point of allocatively efficient production). Alternatively
stated, the model does not judge whether the observed choices are optimal given
market prices, but looks instead at the quantity of outputs one gets from a given
bundle of inputs. However, since both the technical and allocative elements have
important and distinct roles in performance evaluation, information regarding the
technical aspects can be enlightening. This paper offers ways to assess changes in
these areas in response to policy using commonly available data.
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